• 中国科学学与科技政策研究会
  • 中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院
  • 清华大学科学技术与社会研究中心
ISSN 1003-2053 CN 11-1805/G3

科学学研究 ›› 2026, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (9): 1959-1970.

• 前沿与观点 • 上一篇    下一篇

学术不端为何屡禁不止? ———基于中国科研活动的证据

陈婧嫣,薛澜   

  1. 清华大学公共管理学院
  • 收稿日期:2025-06-23 修回日期:2025-08-25 出版日期:2026-09-15 发布日期:2026-09-15
  • 通讯作者: 薛澜
  • 基金资助:
    人工智能与数据要素驱动的科研新范式探索及模式研究

Why does scientific misconduct persist?——Evidence based on research activities in China

  • Received:2025-06-23 Revised:2025-08-25 Online:2026-09-15 Published:2026-09-15
  • Contact: Lan XUE

摘要: 探索学术不端行为发生的原因与机制是科研诚信领域研究的核心前沿议题。然而,以科学社会学为代表的主流理论在非西方语境中解释力不足。本文立足科学社会学理论视角和分析范式,结合中国科研体系特征,构建了中国视角下学术不端成因与机制的解释框架。本研究认为我国科研体系长期遵循“竞争择优”的资源分配机制,迫使研究者围绕优胜权展开竞争。在此环境中,关键压力源并非绝对的评价标准,而是候选人群体内部相对的表现变化。当其他候选人科研表现快速提升时,研究者感知到的压力急剧增大,进而使得科研规范系统的约束被突破,学术不端行为由此发生。基于此,本文通过微观层面(研究者个体)的定量分析对核心因果推断进行了实证检验,结果表明本文的理论框架对中国情境下学术不端行为的原因与机制有较强解释力。最后,本文从科研资源分配、科研组织建设和科研生态培育三个方面提出了政策建议。

Abstract: By creating a novel theoretical framework based in the sociology of science but adapted to China's particular state-led system, this study tackles the ongoing problem of scientific misconduct in the country's research landscape. China has a disproportionately high retraction rate (0.3%, three times the global average), according to an analysis of global retraction data from 2001 to 2020. There are also clear trends, with emerging science nations like China seeing rising retraction shares that surpass their publication output while established powers saw declines. The prevalence of plagiarism and fabrication gave way to more complex types of misconduct, such as paper mills, which had an especially negative effect on the fields of biology and medicine during China's explosive rise in these domains. Historically, universities were the main providers, but in the past ten years, hospitals—which are primarily associated with paper mills—have risen to over half of retractions. These patterns reveal the shortcomings of Western-centric theories such as Merton's concept of "priority" competition. This framework positions China's "Competition for Meritocracy" (You Sheng Quan) as fundamental. Government dominance fosters a resource allocation model characterized by "competition for excellence," compelling researchers to engage in intense rivalry during a "shortlist-selection" process. Success is fundamentally dependent not on absolute "priority" but on attaining relative superiority within a candidate pool, reflecting the principles of "meritocracy." This generates distinct pressure dynamics: the main stressor is uncertainty stemming from the performance escalation of peers within the cohort, rather than from fixed benchmarks. Accelerated average peer growth significantly increases pressure, which, when it surpasses the limitations of national integrity policies and scientific self-regulation, results in misconduct. This framework underwent empirical validation via a rigorous micro-level quantitative analysis of Chinese biology researchers, a field characterized by high levels of misconduct. A matched-pair sample was created consisting of 116 researchers with retractions from 2001 to 2020, paired with 116 controls matched on institution, department, gender, age, education, career stage, and honors, but lacking retractions. The longitudinal career and performance data from 2001 to 2020 resulted in an unbalanced panel comprising 3,920 observations. Logistic regression incorporating time fixed effects validated the primary hypotheses. 1) Increased perceived competitive pressure, indicated by the deviation of individual publication growth from personal moving averages, significantly elevated the probability of misconduct; 2) Accelerated average peer publication growth within the department (lagged) notably heightened misconduct, supporting the peer-driven pressure mechanism; 3) The existence of an active institutional misconduct policy substantially diminished the pressure-misconduct relationship, highlighting the essential role of organizational governance in mitigation. Consequently, the persistence of misconduct in China is fundamentally rooted in the systemic pressures arising from competition for relative status within a meritocratic allocation framework. Effective solutions necessitate structural reform: shifting resource allocation from solely competitive selection to hybrid models that include thresholds; enhancing the governance capacity of research organizations to enforce integrity policies; and promoting collaborative ecosystems to reduce hyper-competition and redirect research towards meaningful innovation. Addressing these systemic drivers is essential for ensuring sustainable research integrity in China and comparable contexts.

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