• 中国科学学与科技政策研究会
  • 中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院
  • 清华大学科学技术与社会研究中心
ISSN 1003-2053 CN 11-1805/G3

科学学研究 ›› 2025, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (7): 1421-1429.

• 理论与方法 • 上一篇    下一篇

“终极同理心机器”构想:理论困境与伦理风险

赵小龙   

  1. 南京大学
  • 收稿日期:2024-07-22 修回日期:2025-02-26 出版日期:2025-07-15 发布日期:2025-07-15
  • 通讯作者: 赵小龙
  • 基金资助:
    当代新兴增强技术前沿的人文主义哲学研究;新兴生命科技的人文风险及其治理路径研究

  • Received:2024-07-22 Revised:2025-02-26 Online:2025-07-15 Published:2025-07-15

摘要: 基于虚拟现实显著的沉浸性特征,米尔克提出了“终极同理心机器”的构想:将虚拟现实视为体验他人生活、感受和情感等的最佳机器,从而促进体验者对他人的同情与支持。该构想开辟了一条区别于传统同理心提升方式的全新可能路径,对于增加人类道德感的技术路径研究具有重要启发性价值。然而,一方面,米尔克在对这一构想进行阐释的过程中,对于同理心的概念内涵、增强人类同理心的必要性以及该机器增强同理心的能力等缺乏全面且深入的探究,导致这一构想面临诸多理论性困境;另一方面,如果将该机器投入使用,亦会产生自我与他者之间形而上学关系的破坏、自我同一性的断裂、同理心脱敏等伦理问题。鉴于以上,人类应当审慎地使用虚拟现实技术。

Abstract: Based on the prominent immersive characteristics of virtual reality (VR), Milk proposed the visionary concept of an "ultimate empathy machine": positioning VR as the optimal apparatus for experiencing others' lives, sensations, and emotions, thereby fostering enhanced compassion and support among users. This groundbreaking proposition unveils a novel pathway distinct from traditional approaches to empathy enhancement, holding significant inspirational value for research into technological routes to augment human morality. However, this ambitious concept encounters substantial challenges from both theoretical and ethical perspectives that warrant thorough examination. From a theoretical standpoint, Milk's framework demonstrates critical deficiencies in three foundational aspects during its elaboration. Firstly, the conceptual boundaries of empathy remain inadequately delineated. The proposal conflates affective empathy (emotional resonance) with cognitive empathy (perspective-taking) while neglecting crucial distinctions between state empathy (temporary responses) and trait empathy (dispositional characteristics). Such conceptual ambiguity creates fundamental uncertainties regarding what precisely the machine purports to enhance. Secondly, the ethical imperative for systematic empathy augmentation lacks rigorous philosophical justification. While casually assuming the inherent value of empathy amplification, the proposal fails to engage with substantive debates in moral philosophy regarding empathy's dual nature - its potential as both a moral motivator and a source of biased decision-making. This oversight becomes particularly problematic given empirical evidence suggesting empathy's tendency to favor in-group members over out-groups. Thirdly, the technological capacity for meaningful empathy transformation remains empirically unsubstantiated. Current neuroscientific research indicates that while VR can induce temporary emotional arousal, the translation of these transient states into enduring personality changes or moral behavioral modifications remains scientifically contentious. The proposal's technological optimism appears disconnected from established psychological models of empathy development, which emphasize complex interactions between biological predispositions and longitudinal social learning. The ethical implications manifest more alarming dimensions when considering practical implementation. First-order concerns involve the metaphysical destabilization of self-other relationships. VR's hyper-realistic simulation of alternate subjectivities risks eroding the phenomenological boundaries essential to intersubjective understanding, potentially reducing human consciousness to interchangeable data patterns rather than unique embodied experiences. Second-order effects threaten personal identity integrity. Chronic immersion in virtual perspectives could induce narrative identity fragmentation, undermining the autobiographical coherence necessary for ethical agency. This "identity diffraction" phenomenon might leave users suspended between multiple virtual selves without achieving meaningful moral integration. Third-order consequences involve systemic empathy desensitization. Paradoxically, the proposed machine might induce emotional burnout through excessive empathy demands, or conversely, create compassion inflation through repeated simulated exposures. Historical precedents from media psychology suggest that overexposure to mediated suffering often leads to compassion fatigue rather than ethical improvement. Of course, the theoretical and practical issues raised by Milk's conception may not be entirely limited to the scope of the above elements. In conclusion, while Milk's proposition offers intriguing possibilities for moral technology, its current formulation requires substantial theoretical refinement and ethical scaffolding. The path forward demands collaborative efforts between VR engineers, moral philosophers, and cognitive scientists to transform this provocative concept into a viable framework for ethical human enhancement. But, at least as things stand. for the multidimensional reasons mentioned above, humans should use virtual reality technology judiciously.