容错机制能激励政府引导基金发挥引导作用吗?

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文以政府引导基金容错机制的实施为准自然实验,运用多期DID方法进行政策评估。研究发现:容错机制实施当年促进了引导基金投资早期、早期科技型初创企业,政策实施次年抑制了引导基金投向早期、早期科技型企业。机制研究表明,容错机制实施当年提高了引导基金的风险承担水平和使用效率,但在次年降低了引导基金的风险承担水平,而对使用效率的影响不显著。异质性研究表明,经验丰富的基金管理机构降低了政策的作用,有限合伙制基金会提升政策实施当年的正向作用。进一步研究表明,容错机制实施当年提高了本省引导基金对外省早期科技型企业的投资,同时增加了引导基金对风险投资活跃地区早期科技型企业的投资;次年容错机制抑制了引导基金对风险投资活跃地区早期初创企业的投资。结论表明容错机制产生了“昙花一现”的激励作用。因此,政策有效落地需要各地对容错机制进行优化调整,制定更加精准有效的措施,保障政策执行与政策意图相一致。

关键词: 政府引导基金, 容错机制, 风险承担, 使用效率

Abstract:

This paper applies the multi-period DID method to conduct policy evaluation of the quasi-natural experiment implementing a government-guided fund fault-tolerance mechanism. Our main findings are as follows. First, the fault-tolerance mechanism stimulates the governmental guidance fund to invest in early and early high-tech start-ups in the first year and decreases the investment next year. The opposite policy effects are robust. Second, the influencing mechanism shows that the fault-tolerant mechanism increases the guiding fund risk-bearing level and improves the utilization efficiency in the first year. But it reduces the risk-bearing level and has no significant effect on the utilization efficiency of the guiding fund next year. Third, we study the heterogeneity to show that experienced investment institutions reduce the effect of policies in the first year and the following year. But the funds with limited partnerships increase the positive policy effect in the first year. Last, we further show that the fault tolerance mechanism stimulates the investment of the local province's guiding fund in early high-tech startup firms in other provinces, while increasing the investment in early high-tech startups of VC-active regions. The fault tolerance mechanism depresses the following year's investment in early startup firms in VC-active areas. We conclude that the incentive effect of the fault-tolerant mechanism is a "flash in the pan". Therefore, the local government needs to optimize and adjust the fault-tolerance mechanism in order to make more precise and effective measures, ensuring that the policy implementation is consistent with policy intentions.

Key words: government guidance fund, fault-tolerance mechanisms, risk-taking, utilization efficiency

中图分类号:

F832

梁蔚萍, 周翔翼. 容错机制能激励政府引导基金发挥引导作用吗?[J]. 科学学研究, 2024, 42(1): 85-97.

LINAG Wei-ping, ZHOU Xiang-yi. Can the fault-tolerance mechanisms stimulate government-guiding fund to play the guiding role?[J]. Studies in Science of Science, 2024, 42(1): 85-97.

图/表 14

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variables	N	mean	p50	sd	min	max
Early_Amount_SP	2270	93.282	12.000	193.017	0.000	878.785
Earlytec_Amount_SP	2270	64.877	5.000	160.868	0.000	770.321
Tolerance	2270	0.158	0	0.365	0	1
GDP	2270	9.048	8.821	2.88	3.714	16.489
GVC	2270	0.041	0	0.198	0	1
Base	2270	0.734	1	0.442	0	1
Partner	2270	0.879	1	0.326	0	1
Expert	2270	78.166	17	145.197	1	1145
IPO_A	2270	240.291	223	126.919	2	483
Market	2270	3433.263	3341.62	1437.077	791.649	5592.278
Found_size	2270	35.099	3.5	161.464	0.3	1387
Tax	2270	0.504	1	0.500	0	1
Risktaking_Early_SP	2270	0.218	0.035	0.307	0.000	1.000
Risktaking_Earlytec_SP	2270	0.147	0.013	0.260	0.000	1.000
FundInvest_effect	2252	0.703	0.600	0.399	0.182	3.000
fund_invest_effect_SP	2210	0.875	0.917	0.156	0.000	1.000
foundeffect_SP	2270	0.837	0.915	0.231	0.000	1.000

variables	N	mean	p50	sd	min	max
Early_Amount_SP	2270	93.282	12.000	193.017	0.000	878.785
Earlytec_Amount_SP	2270	64.877	5.000	160.868	0.000	770.321
Tolerance	2270	0.158	0	0.365	0	1
GDP	2270	9.048	8.821	2.88	3.714	16.489
GVC	2270	0.041	0	0.198	0	1
Base	2270	0.734	1	0.442	0	1
Partner	2270	0.879	1	0.326	0	1
Expert	2270	78.166	17	145.197	1	1145
IPO_A	2270	240.291	223	126.919	2	483
Market	2270	3433.263	3341.62	1437.077	791.649	5592.278
Found_size	2270	35.099	3.5	161.464	0.3	1387
Tax	2270	0.504	1	0.500	0	1
Risktaking_Early_SP	2270	0.218	0.035	0.307	0.000	1.000
Risktaking_Earlytec_SP	2270	0.147	0.013	0.260	0.000	1.000
FundInvest_effect	2252	0.703	0.600	0.399	0.182	3.000
fund_invest_effect_SP	2210	0.875	0.917	0.156	0.000	1.000
foundeffect_SP	2270	0.837	0.915	0.231	0.000	1.000

	政策实施当年				政策实施次年
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	早期	早期	早期科技	早期科技	早期	早期	早期科技	早期科技
Tolerance	2.803^***	2.814^***	3.409^***	3.436^***	-6.657^***	-6.621^***	-5.821^***	-5.781^***
	(0.976)	(0.977)	(1.060)	(1.054)	(0.897)	(0.888)	(0.897)	(0.887)
Controls		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fund FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,813	1,813	1,813	1,813	1,741	1,741	1,741	1,741
R-squared	0.807	0.807	0.764	0.765	0.84	0.84	0.775	0.776

	政策实施当年				政策实施次年
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	早期	早期	早期科技	早期科技	早期	早期	早期科技	早期科技
Tolerance	2.803^***	2.814^***	3.409^***	3.436^***	-6.657^***	-6.621^***	-5.821^***	-5.781^***
	(0.976)	(0.977)	(1.060)	(1.054)	(0.897)	(0.888)	(0.897)	(0.887)
Controls		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fund FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,813	1,813	1,813	1,813	1,741	1,741	1,741	1,741
R-squared	0.807	0.807	0.764	0.765	0.84	0.84	0.775	0.776

	政策实施当年		政策实施次年
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	早期科技	早期科技	早期科技	早期科技
Tolerance	3.406^***	3.439^***	-5.972^***	-5.931^***
	(1.075)	(1.070)	(0.946)	(0.937)
Tax	-0.025	0.029	-1.267	-1.242
	(0.701)	(0.705)	(1.011)	(1.011)
Controls		Yes		Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fund FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,813	1,813	1,741	1,741
R-squared	0.764	0.765	0.776	0.777